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POLICY NOTE
STATES ARE MAKING THEIR OWN DECISIONS
REGARDING WHETHER MARIJUANA SHOULD BE
ILLEGAL: How SHOULD THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
REACT?

By Joseph Tutro
I.

INTRODUCTION

On November 6, 2012,1 three states proposed
landmark legislation for a vote to the people of their
respective states.2 These landmark pieces of legislation
allowed for the recreational use of marijuana. 3 While the
potential legislation failed in Oregon, the proposed
legislation passed in Colorado and Washington.4
Washington's marijuana legislation went into effect on
December 6, 2012," and Colorado Governor John
Hickenlooper signed Colorado's marijuana legislation into
law on December 10, 2012.6 The passage of recreational

1This date represents Election Day 2012.
2 See Colorado, Washington Pass Marijuana Legalization; Oregon
AM),
01:05
2012,
7,
(Nov.
No,
CNN
Says
http://politicalticker.blogs.cnn.com/2012/11/07/colorado-washingtonass-marijuana-legalization-oregon-says-no/.
Id.
4Id.
5 Gene Johnson, Legalizing Marijuana: Washington Law Goes into
Effect, Allowing RecreationalUse of Drug, HUFFINGTON PosT (Dec. 6,
PM),
03:42
2012,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/12/06/legalizing-marijuanawashington-state n_2249238.html.
6 Will C. Holden & Thomas Hendrick, Governor Signs Amendment 64,
MarijuanaOfficially Legal in Colorado, KDVR (Dec. 10, 2012, 12:14
http://kdvr.com/2012/12/10/governor-signs-amendment-64PM),
marijuana-officially-legal-in-colorado/.
1
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marijuana usage legislation in Colorado and Washington
joins them with twenty states, plus the District of
Columbia, which have legalized use of marijuana for
medical purposes.7
While it has been legalized by the states, marijuana
still remains illegal under federal law.8 Because of the
Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution,9
federal law remains binding on the states.' 0 Therefore,
while the states have passed legislation legalizing the use of
marijuana, whether for medical use or recreational use,
these laws are essentially moot due to federal law. The
issue now is whether the federal government will
investigate and prosecute those who follow their state
marijuana laws or will use investigatory and prosecutorial
discretion to allow the laws to take effect.
This paper will discuss the ever-widening
acceptance by state legislatures of marijuana, especially for
medical purposes, and the refusal by the federal
government to recognize these acceptances, thus resulting
in a federalism fight. The federal government should use
its investigatory and prosecutorial discretion to allow these
state experiments with marijuana. The current arguments
for keeping marijuana illegal can be examined by allowing
the states to implement their new and existing marijuana
laws.

7 See

20 Legal Medical Marijuana States and DC, PROCON.ORG (Jan.
7,
2013,
01:42
PM),
http://medicalmarijuana.procon.org/view.resource.php?resourcelD=000
881.
821 U.S.C. §§ 812(c)(c)(10), 844(a) (2006).
9 U.S. CONST. art. IV, cl. 2.
1o Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 29 (2005) ("The Supremacy Clause
unambiguously provides that if there is any conflict between federal
and state law, federal law shall prevail.").
2
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II.

THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF FEDERAL
MARIJUANA LAWS

The first federal legislation that attempted to
regulate drugs in interstate commerce came in 1906.11 But
the primary drug control law came in the form of the
Harrison Narcotics Act of 1914.12 This act attempted to
control narcotics mainly by assessing taxes. Then the first
real attempt by Congress to regulate marijuana occurred in
1937.13 The 1937 law "did not outlaw the possession or
sale of marijuana outright."l 4 However, the law imposed
strict administrative requirements and high taxes on the
trade of marijuana.' 5 Then, in 1969, "President Nixon
declared a national 'war on drugs."" 6 In response to this
declaration, Congress enacted the Comprehensive Drug
Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 or Controlled
Substances Act (CSA).1 7 The CSA repealed most of the
previous antidrug laws.' 8
Under the CSA, narcotics are placed in one of five
schedules.19 Congress placed marijuana in Schedule 1.20
Being classified as a Schedule I drugs means that marijuana
meets three criteria: (1) a "high potential for abuse"; (2)
"lack of any accepted medical use"; and (3) an "absence of
any accepted safety for use in medically supervised
treatment."21 By classifying marijuana as a Schedule I
1 Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906, ch. 3915, 34 Stat. 768, repealed by
Act of June 25, 1938, ch. 675, § 902(a), 52 Stat. 1059.
12 Harrison Narcotics Act of 1914, 38 Stat. 785 (repealed 1970).
13Marihuana Tax Act of 1937, 50 Stat. 551 (repealed 1970).
14 Raich, 545 U.S. at 11.
" See id.
Id. at 10.
1721 U.S.C. §§ 801-971 (2006).
18Raich, 545 U.S. at 12.

'921 U.S.C. § 812(a) (2006).
§ 812(c)(c)(10) (2006).
21Raich, 545 U.S. at 14; see also 21 U.S.C. § 812(b)(1) (2006).
2021 U.S.C.

3
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drug, the only research that can be performed on the drug is
through "a Food and Drug Administration pre-approved
research study." 22
Even with the CSA in place, eighteen states enacted
legislation that attempts to legalize marijuana for medical
purposes prior to the votes on recreational marijuana usage
laws in 2012. 23 Then, in 2012, two states legalized
24
However, the CSA
marijuana for recreational use.
remains in place, and marijuana is still classified as a
Schedule I drug. 25
CSA

III.

CHALLENGING THE

a.

Challenges in Federal Courts

Because Colorado and Washington are the first
states to legalize the recreational use of marijuana,26 the
majority of the development of the law has focused on the
use of medical marijuana. The first challenge to the CSA
came in the form of a medical necessity defense.2 7 Without
bringing criminal charges, the United States sought to
enjoin certain medical marijuana dis ensaries from
manufacturing and distributing marijuana. The Supreme
22

Raich, 545 U.S. at 14.
See 20 Legal Medical MarijuanaStates and DC, PROCON.ORG (Jan.
7,
2013,
01:42
PM),
http://medicalmarijuana.procon.org/view.resource.php?resourcelD=000
881.
24 See COLO. CONST. art. XVIII, § 16; WASH. REV. CODE § 69.50.325
(LEXIS through 2013 Regular Session); WASH. REV. CODE § 69.50.535
(LEXIS through 2013 Regular Session).
25 21 U.S.C. § 812(c)(c)(10) (2006).
26 See COLO. CONST. art. XVIII, § 16; WASH. REV. CODE § 69.50.325;
WASH. REV. CODE § 69.50.535.
27 United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Coop., 532 U.S. 483
(2001).
28 See id. at 486-87.
23
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Court narrowly held that the medical necessity defense
does not apply to those who manufacture and distribute
marijuana. Therefore, the United States was successful in
enjoining the medical marijuana dispensaries.
The seminal case regarding the legalization of
marijuana by states is Gonzales v. Raich.30 Raich deals
specifically with the medical marijuana laws of
California. 3 1 The plaintiffs believed that the CSA, as
applied to them, "would violate the Commerce Clause, the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, the Ninth and
Tenth Amendments of the Constitution, and the doctrine of
medical necessity." 32 The district court denied their motion
for a preliminary injunction.33 The Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit reversed, agreeing with the plaintiffs that
"the CSA is an unconstitutional exercise of Congress'
Commerce Clause authority." 34
The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the
Ninth Circuit, justifying the CSA as a "valid exercise of
federal power" under the Commerce Clause. 35 The Court's
main justification was "the undisputed magnitude of the
commercial market for marijuana."36 Therefore, the Court
found that "Congress could have rationally concluded that
the aggregate impact on the national market of all the
transactions exempted from federal supervision is
unquestionably substantial."3 7 Thus, the Court remanded
the case to the Ninth Circuit.

Id. at 486.
Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
31 See id. at 5.
32 Id. at 8.
33 Id.
34 Raich v. Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 1222, 1227 (9th Cir. 2003).
3 Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 9 (2005).
36
Id. at 33.
37
1Id. at 32.
29

30

5
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On remand, the Ninth Circuit rejected the other
arguments put forth by the plaintiffs.3 8 The court was
uncertain whether the Supreme Court's previous decision
regarding the medical necessity defense was binding on the
case. 39 To avoid the question, the court stated that the
question would better be resolved in a criminal
proceeding.40 The court also rejected the substantive due
process argument because "federal law does not recognize
a fundamental right to use medical marijuana prescribed by
a licensed physician to alleviate excruciating pain and
human suffering" at the present time. 4 1 Finally, the court
rejected the Tenth Amendment argument because of the
Supreme Court's decision regarding the Commerce
Clause.4 2
b.

Administrative Challenges

Besides the traditional method of seeking to enjoin
the enforcement of the CSA against the plaintiffs, an
alternate option is to petition the Drug Enforcement
Agency (DEA) to reschedule marijuana. 43 Congress has
delegated its CSA rescheduling powers to the Attorney
General.4 4 The Attorney General, in turn, has delegated
these powers to the DEA.45 The DEA has recently denied
petitions to reschedule marijuana46 after seeking a
"scientific and medical evaluation" 47 by the Department of
38

See Raich v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d 850 (9th Cir. 2007).

39

Id. at 860.
Id. at 861.

40

Id. at 866.
Id. at 867.
See 21 U.S.C. §§ 811, 812 (2006).
' 21 U.S.C. § 811(a) (2006).
45 Am. for Safe Access v. DEA, 706 F.3d 438,441 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
46 See, e.g., Denial of Petition to Initiate Proceedings to Reschedule
Marijuana, 76 Fed. Reg. 40,552 (July 8, 2011).
47 21 U.S.C. § 811(b) (2006).
41
42
43
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Health and Human Services (DHHS). 4 8 The DHHS's
recommendation to the DEA is that "research on the
medical use of marijuana has not progressed to the point
that marijuana can be considered to have a 'currently
accepted medical use' or a 'currently accepted medical use
with severe restrictions."' 49
Therefore, while state
legislatures have determined that marijuana has medical
uses, the federal government has not been convinced by the
current clinical research and further research is required.
IV.

FEDERAL AND STATE POLICIES

a.

Federal Policy on Medical Marijuana: The
Ogden Memo

The most interesting document showing the federal
government's policy regarding medical marijuana is the
"Medical Marijuana Guidance" memorandum, which was
prepared by then-Deputy Attorney General David Ogden
(Ogden Memo). 5 0 The Ogden Memo was distributed from
the United States Department of Justice to "SELECTED
UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS." 5' The goal of the
memorandum was to give "clarification and guidance to
federal prosecutors in States that have enacted laws
authorizing the medical use of marijuana." 5 2
While the Ogden Memo did "not 'legalize'
marijuana or provide a legal defense to a violation of
48

Am. for Safe Access, 706 F.3d at 442.
Denial of Petition to Initiate Proceedings to Reschedule Marijuana,
76 Fed. Reg. 40,552, 40,562 (July 8, 2011).
50 David W. Ogden, Deputy Attorney General, Investigations and
Prosecutionsin States Authorizing the Medical Use of Marijuana,U.S.
DEP'T
OF
JUST. (Oct
19,
2009),
http://www.justice.gov/opa/documents/medical-marijuana.pdf.
" Id. at 1.
52 Id.
49

7
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federal law ... [and] is intended solely as a guide to the
exercise of investigative and prosecutorial discretion,"53 the
memorandum acknowledged that "[a]s a general matter,
pursuit of [drug traffickers of illegal drugs] should not
focus federal resources in your States on individuals whose
actions are in clear and unambiguous compliance with
existing state laws providing for the medical use of
marijuana." 54 Thus, while acknowledging that the CSA is
still federal law, the United States Attorneys should
"mak[e] efficient and rational use of [the Department's]
limited investigative and prosecutorial resources," and
prosecuting those who comply with "existing state law ...
is unlikely to be an efficient use of limited federal
resources."5
While the Ogden Memo focuses on prosecution of
those following medical marijuana laws, it also points out
the reasons that the United States Attorneys should still
pursue illegal drug traffickers. 56 The memorandum states
that "the illegal distribution and sale of marijuana is a
serious crime and provides a significant source of revenue
to large-scale criminal enterprises, gangs, and cartels." 5 7
As a telling example, the Ogden Memo states that
"marijuana distribution in the United States remains the
single largest source of revenue for the Mexican cartels." 58
This reasoning is interesting because it would apply to both
medical and recreational use of marijuana. Thus, the
memorandum sheds some light on the federal government's
policy toward recreational use of marijuana.

5

1Id. at 2.

54

Id. at 1-2.

55 id.

See id. at 1.
Id. at 1.
58Id.
56
5
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b.

State Purposes for Legalizing Recreational
Marijuana

Colorado amended its own constitution to legalize
marijuana.59 The amendment starts by stating the purpose
of the legalization:
In the interest of the efficient
use of law enforcement
resources, enhancing revenue
for public purposes, and
individual
freedom,
the
people of the state of
Colorado find and declare
that the use of marijuana
should be legal for persons
twenty-one years of age or
older and taxed in a manner
similar to alcohol.6 0
The amendment states three very distinct
reasons for legalizing marijuana. The rest of the
amendment contains the restrictions and regulations
These restrictions and
regarding marijuana.61
regulations fairly mirror those that are placed on
alcohol.62
While Washington's marijuana legislation does
not specifically state its purpose, the purpose can be
from the statutory language.
fairly deduced
Washington's marijuana legislation states in pertinent
part as follows:
59

COLO. CONST. art. XVIII, § 16.

60 COLo. CONST. art. XVIII, § 16(1)(a).
61See COLO. CONST. art. XVIII, § 16.

62 COLO. CONST. art. XVIII, § 16(1)(b).
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There is levied and collected
a marijuana excise tax equal
to twenty-five percent of the
selling
price
on
each
wholesale sale in this state of
marijuana by a licensed
marijuana producer to a
licensed marijuana processor
or another licensed marijuana
producer. This tax is the
obligation of the licensed
marijuana producer. 63
The first purpose is to receive taxes on the sale
of marijuana. 64 In fact, the legislation taxes marijuana
three times before it reaches the consumer.65 The other
implied purpose is to control who can sell marijuana. 66
V.

THE FUTURE OF THE FEDERALISM FIGHT
OVER MARUUANA

The issue now becomes what stance the federal
government will take with regard to the recreational use
laws. The biggest problem is the fear that those who
cultivate and distribute marijuana, even while following
state law, will be subject to punishment by the federal
government. The federal government must decide whether
to investigate and prosecute those people.
The closest analogy to the current situation is the
prohibition of alcohol in the 1920s and 1930s. 67 The
63 WASH. REV. CODE
64

See WASH.

65 id.

66

67

§ 69.50.535.
§ 69.50.535.

REV. CODE

See WASH. REV. CODE § 69.50.325.
U.S. CONsT. amend. XVIII (repealed 1933).
10
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Eighteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution
made "the manufacture, sale, or transportation of
intoxicating liquors" illegal.6 8 While the amendment had
an initial positive effect, the long-term effect was an
increase in not only crime but also organized crime.6 9
Because the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors
was illegal, those who participated in the organized crime
were able to pocket the entirety of the profits without being
taxed.70 The negative effects ultimately led to the TwentyFirst Amendment, which repealed the Eighteenth
Amendment in its entirety.7 1
The biggest difference between the 1920s alcohol
prohibition and the current marijuana initiative is that the
alcohol prohibition was performed by amendment and
subsequently repealed by amendment. The CSA, however,
is a statute that has been held valid under the Commerce
Clause. 72 Congress's inaction with respect to the CSA has
caused states to reevaluate the goals of the CSA
themselves. As Justice O'Connor astutely notes in her
dissent in Raich, "[o]ne of federalism's chief virtues, of
course, is that it promotes innovation by allowing for the
possibility that 'a single courageous State may, if its
citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social
and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the

country."'

68

73

U.S. CONsT. amend. XVIII, cl. 1 (repealed 1933).

69 id.

See id.
" U.S. CONST. amend. XXI.
72 See Raich v. Gonzales, 545 U.S.
1 (2005).
7 Raich, 545 U.S. at 42 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting New State
Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting)).
70
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This situation is the ultimate "novel social and
economic experiment[]." 7 4 The economic element of the
experiment is readily apparent. Both Washington and
Colorado have explicitly or impliedly stated that a main
goal of the legislation is to recover taxes on the sale of
Further, Colorado has explicitly stated that
marijuana.
this effort is "[i]n the interest of the efficient use of law
By legalizing the sale of
enforcement resources."76
marijuana, Colorado no longer has to focus as much of its
policing efforts on marijuana law enforcement. Similarly,
there is a beneficial economic impact on the judicial system
that is not so apparent. For example, by lowering arrests on
marijuana crimes, costs can be saved in the judicial system.
Further, with fewer arrests there will be fewer convictions,
which could save money in the prison system.
The reasoning in the Ogden Memo should provide
guidance on which policy to follow in this situation. The
fact that commercial marijuana distribution "provides a
significant source of revenue to large-scale criminal
enterprises, gangs, and cartels," such as the Mexican drug
cartel,7 7 pushes for a policy allowing these states to
experiment with their recreational use marijuana laws. If
the sale of marijuana provides revenue to these groups, then
it must follow that marijuana is being sold in the United
States. By allowing the states to regulate the sale of
marijuana, the states, and potentially the United States in
the future, will receive at least a portion of this revenue that
the criminal enterprises are currently collecting. The loss

New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis,
J., dissenting).
7
See COLO. CONST. art. XVIII, § 16(1)(a); WASH. REV. CODE §
69.50.527 (LEXIS through 2012 Second Special Session).
76 COLO. CONST. art. XVIII, § 16(1)(a).
77 Ogden, supra note 50, at 1.
74
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of revenue for the criminal enterprises may even curtail
their other criminal ventures.
It is important to emphasize that at least a portion
of the revenue may be recovered and that these laws may
curtail other criminal ventures. The reason that it is
important to emphasize these points is because we do not
know the exact effect that the recreational marijuana use
laws will have. Until we have actual, tangible evidence on
the effect of legalizing marijuana, we will not know.
Therefore, the federal government should use investigatory
and prosecutorial discretion to allow these laws to take
effect until this evidence is compiled. After evidence is
gathered regarding its effects on the criminal enterprises,
then the policy can be revisited and changed if necessary.
Although recreational marijuana may only be legal
in two states, the federal government remains interested
because there is always potential for the legal marijuana to
cross state borders.78 As noted above, however, the fact
that criminal enterprises are receiving revenue from the sale
of marijuana means that these criminal enterprises are still
selling marijuana in the United States. This begs the
question of whether we as a country would rather have
marijuana, which has been taxed and regulated, sold across
state borders or whether we as a country would rather have
the illegal sale of marijuana continue in those states.
However, the argument may then be that the sale of the
legal marijuana across state borders may create new
criminal enterprises. But, again, we do not know the effect
that these laws will have. Therefore, the effects of
legalized marijuana should not be evaluated until we gather
evidence either way.
Washington's Governor Inslee and Attorney
General Ferguson met with United States Attorney General
78

See U.S. CONST. art. I,

§ 8, cl. 3.
13
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Eric Holder on January 22, 2013.79 The three did not
discuss Holder's intentions regarding investigatory and
However, Governor Inslee
prosecutorial discretion.
decided to continue with implementation and rule-making
for the law.8 While the federal government's policy was
not explicitly stated, we can be sure that the policy is not to
stop the implementation of the law at the outset. 82
VI.

CONCLUSION

Although twenty states have legalized marijuana for
medical use, two states have taken the bold initiative to
legalize marijuana for recreational use. The legalization is
directly contrary to the legislative decision made by the
United States Congress in the CSA. The Supreme Court
has upheld the CSA against constitutional challenges
because it found that the CSA is a valid exercise of power
by Congress under the Commerce Clause. Because the law
is a valid exercise of federal power, the states are limited to
implementing their new marijuana laws only if the United
States Attorneys allow the laws to take effect by using their
investigatory and prosecutorial discretion.
The United States Attorneys should use their
discretion to allow the states to implement these laws until
evidence can be gathered on the laws' economic effects and
their effects on criminal enterprises. After gathering this
evidence, both the states and federal government should
convene and determine the next step, whether that step is to
keep marijuana illegal or to push for legalizing marijuana
See Bob Young, Inslee Encouragedby MarijuanaTalk with Attorney
General Holder, SEATTLE TIMES (Jan. 23, 2013, 04:04 PM),
http://seattletimes.com/html/localnews/2020190301 _insleeholderpotxm
1.html.
so Id.
81
id.
82 See id.
7
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under the CSA. Therefore, this situation creates the perfect
time to "try novel social and economic experiments without
risk to the rest of the country," 83 and the federal
government should recognize the opportunity.

83 New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis,

J., dissenting).
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